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EVIDENCE
George W. Pugh* and James R. McClelland**
RELEVANCY
Other Crimes Evidence-Categorizing or Pigeonholing Exceptions
A recurring issue that seems to concern members of the Louisiana
Supreme Court revolves around the advantages and disadvantages of
categorizing or "pigeonholing" exceptions to the other crimes exclu-
sionary rule.' It seems clear that in the wake of State v. Prieura the
court, when it found it appropriate, has been willing to expand the very
limited exceptions to the other crimes evidence exclusionary rule rec-
ognized in Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:445-446 (knowledge, intent,
system).3
Because of the great difficulty in foreseeing the fact patterns that
may emerge in the future, the writers certainly agree that the court
should not be "iron-bound" to limit the exceptions to those listed in
the statute, nor to the expanded listing previously recognized by the
court. Nevertheless it seems very desirable and helpful for the court to
continue to categorize or pigeonhole the exceptions, for to do so provides
a salutary analytical restraint. The notion underlying the exclusionary
rule is the concept that other crimes evidence is so dangerous that unless
it has a peculiar relevancy-one that in context overbalances the inev-
itable prejudice-the evidence should be excluded. Rather than simply
striking a balance, in general terms, between prejudice and relevancy,
it sharpens analysis, it is believed, for court and counsel to identify the
precise exception involved (i.e., to categorize it), and to analyze precisely
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1. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 440 So. 2d 134, 139 (La. 1983) (Dennis, J., dissenting);
State v. Germain, 433 So. 2d 110, 120 (La. 1983) (Lemmon, J., concurring). See also
State v. Kahey, 436 So. 2d 475, 487 (La. 1983).
2. 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
3. See State v. Kahey, 436 So. 2d 475 (La. 1983) (discussing the exceptions thus
far recognized by the Louisiana Supreme Court). See also Pugh & McClelland, The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Evidence, 36 La. L. Rev.
651, 652 (1976), reprinted in G. Pugh, Louisiana Evidence Law 105 (Supp. 1978) [here-
inafter cited as G. Pugh (Supp.)].
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the reasons why the evidence in this context should or should not be
admitted. There was a time in our jurisprudence, in the decade im-
mediately prior to Prieur, when Louisiana courts were far too receptive
to other crimes evidence. 4 Prieur was a reaction to and correction of
that tendency. Identifying and categorizing exceptions, it is believed,
helps to prevent a return to that overly lax era.
Character of the Victim in a Homicide Case
Prior to 1952, Louisiana Revised Statute 15:482 provided that: "In
the absence of proof of hostile demonstration or of overt act on the
part of the person slain or injured, evidence of his dangerous character
or of his threats against accused is not admissible." 5 In that year, the
provision was amended to substitute the word "evidence" for the word
"proof." The obvious intent underlying the legislative change was to
make it clear that the trial court is not to determine whether evidence
introduced establishes or proves an overt act or hostile demonstration;
it was rather that evidence thereof suffices to provide the foundation
for the introduction of testimony of the dangerous character of the
victim or the victim's prior threats against the accused. Courts, however,
continued to show great reluctance to apply the more relaxed standard.
6
In 1976, in State v. Lee,7 the supreme court, expressly overruling
contrary cases, held that "appreciable evidence" of the overt act or
hostile demonstration suffices to meet the required statutory test. Further,
the supreme court made clear that a trial court is not to reject evidence
as. to, character of the victim because it finds the proffered evidence
with respect to the required overt act or hostile demonstration incredible.
The credibility question under the dictates of the statute, concluded the
court, is a question for the jury.
The approach taken by the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal
in State v. Sylvester,8 appears to these writers to be contra to that
prescribed in State v. Lee-its opinion in Sylvester seems to revert to
4. See the excellent discussion in Comment, Other Crimes Evidence in Louisiana-
To Show Knowledge, Intent, System, Etc., in the Case in Chief, 33 La. L. Rev. 614
(1973), reprinted in G. Pugh, Louisiana Evidence Law 30 (1974) [hereinafter cited as G.
Pugh].
5. La. R.S. 15:482 (1950) (emphasis added).
6. See Note, Character and Prior Conduct of the Victim In Support of a Plea of
Self-Defense, 37 La. L. Rev. 1166 (1977), reprinted in G. Pugh (Supp.), supra note 3,
at 62; Pugh & McClelland, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-
1976 Term-Evidence, 37 La. L. Rev. 575, 576 (1977), reprinted in G. Pugh (Supp.)
supra note 3, at 68; Pugh & McClelland, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1974-1975 Term-Evidence, 36 La. L. Rev. 651, 654 (1976), reprinted in G. Pugh
(Supp.), supra note 3, at 70.
7. 331 So. 2d 455 (1975), aff'd on reh'g, 331 So..2d 463 (La. 1976).
8. 438 So. 2d 1277 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 444 So. 2d 606 (1984).
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the pre-Lee attitude. In Sylvester, a homicide case, the defendant testified
that at the time of the incident in question, the victim threatened to
kill him, picked up a pistol and pointed it at him. The court of appeal,
noting that there were no eyewitnesses and that the defendant's testimony
contradicted the physical evidence, held that there was not "appreciable
evidence" of an overt act or hostile demonstration, and therefore af-
firmed the action of the trial court in refusing to permit the defendant
to testify as to antecedent actions of the victim against the defendant.
With deference, the writers disagree. Although the word "appreciable"
was not defined in State v. Lee, it seems that the court of appeal in
Sylvester gave it an erroneous interpretation. Lee made clear that, because
of the 1952 legislation, the credibility question as to the presence or
absence of an overt act or hostile demonstration is an issue for the jury
to resolve, not one for the trial judge. Sworn testimony by a witness,
even a biased witness, that the victim of a homicide had pointed a
pistol at the defendant, certainly seems "appreciable evidence" of hostile
demonstration or overt act. The subsequent treatment of the case by
the Louisiana Supreme Court, although laconic, seems clearly to support
this interpretation. 9
Rape Shield Statute
State v. Vaughn ° is a very important case relative to the consti-
tutionality of applying Louisiana's rape shield statute in a particularized
context. At the time of the alleged crime, the defendant was a 51-year-
old man and the victim a 15-year-old girl. Although charged with ag-
gravated rape, defendant had been convicted of forcible rape. On appeal
to the supreme court, a divided court on original hearing voted to
reverse defendant's conviction. On rehearing, the court, again divided,
reversed itself and affirmed the conviction.
To sustain its charge of aggravated rape the prosecution was ob-
ligated to prove that the sexual acts in question were without the consent
of the alleged victim. The accused's defense was that the girl had
consented. The factual denouement is important.
The alleged victim, about two weeks before the incident in question,
ran away from home in Shreveport. About a week later, she hitch-hiked
to Alexandria with a girlfriend and a man she had met that day. In
9. The disposition by the Louisiana Supreme Court on writ application in the
Sylvester case is reported as follows in 444 So.2d 606 (1984):
Denied. The result is correct.
DIXON, C.J., and LEMMON, J., concur in the denial. R.S. 15:48 [sic] is
misquoted and misapjlied by the Court of Appeal in Assignment # 1. Never-
theless, the victim's dangerous character was well established, and the error was
harmless.
10. 448 So. 2d 1260 (1983), rev'd on reh'g, 448 So. 2d 1266 (La. 1984).
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Alexandria she spent at least one night in a cabin with that man and
another man. Thereafter she met the defendant and voluntarily slept in
the same bed with him and two other girls. She admitted that initially
she voluntarily had sexual relations with defendant, but maintained that
three days later he forced her to have sexual relations with him in the
presence of two other girls. Later the same day she went to Lafayette
with yet another man, but voluntarily returned to defendant's abode
where, she testified, out of fear she again had sexual relations with
defendant.
In his effort to show that the victim had consented, defendant
sought to introduce evidence that, after running away from home, while
en route from Shreveport to Alexandria, five days prior to the allegedly
forced sexual act with the defendant, the young girl had had voluntary
sexual relations with a man other than the defendant.
The majority of the supreme court on original hearing concluded
that defendant's right of confrontation had been denied when he had
been precluded from inquiring into a purported act of sexual intercourse
with the third person. The court concluded that "the defendant was
deprived of his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine wit-
nesses because the cross-examination attempted by defense counsel was
reasonably calculated to elicit evidence which was genuinely relevant,
highly probative, and critical to the defense . . . .." In so concluding,
the then majority reasoned that "[tihe excluded evidence would have
tended to demonstrate the complainant's sexual promiscuity in the course
of her running away from home," that it "would have tended to show
that her sexual intercourse with Vaughn was a part of this same pattern
and was committed in furtherance of her running away from home."'"
On rehearing, the majority of the court took a very different view,
concluding that an act of voluntary sexual intercourse with another
person, five days prior to the involuntary charged act with the defendant,
simply was not relevant to show the consent claimed. It agreed, however,
that under certain circumstances the rape shield statute must yield to
the constitutional rights of the defendant. "Nevertheless," said the court,
"before such evidence may be held admissible, the defendant must clearly
demonstrate that the evidence of prior sexual conduct is genuinely pro-
bative of the issue of consent, rather than a reflection of the victim's
promiscuity."' 3
In the opinion of the writers, the evidence in question was indeed
relevant. The real question, it is submitted, is whether the prior act was
sufficiently relevant to overbalance the type of considerations that
prompted the adoption of the rape shield statute. The writers believe
II. Id. at 1262.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1268.
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that it was and that the inquiry should have been permitted. Had
defendant been able to show the voluntary sexual intercourse with the
third person, this taken with other testimony, would have been persuasive
evidence that the charged act was voluntary.
WITNESSES
Impeachment- When Permissible
When is "impeachment" permissible? The nature of impeachment
is that it is a device available to attack the credibility of a witness. By
this device, in order to neutralize adverse testimony, a party injured by
the testimony may often bring in evidence not otherwise available. Since
a party may in this way bring to the trier of fact evidence that would
otherwise generally be inadmissible, the instances in which a party may
be permitted to "impeach" a witness have traditionally been limited. 4
For example, to prevent a party from utilizing the impeachment device
to bring to the attention of the jury evidence not otherwise admissible,
it was traditionally held that one may not generally impeach one's own
witness, absent exceptional circumstances."
If a witness has neither affirmatively helped nor actually damaged
a party, but has merely said he does not remember the fact to which
the examiner wishes him to testify, it has traditionally been held that
the examining party may not impeach the witness by some out-of-court
statement, for to do so would be to permit a de facto circumvention
of the hearsay rule. 6
Although not discussing the above problem, State v. Laprime 7 seems
to run contra to these principles. Very damaging testimony was intro-
duced by the prosecution, over objection, ostensibly to "impeach" a
prosecution witness who had said he did not remember the incident in
question. As noted by Justice Lemmon in his concurring opinion, nothing
in the out-of-court statement contradicted testimony given by the witness
on the stand. Impeachment, therefore, by the out-of-court testimony,
it is submitted, was improper.' 8
14. See McCormick on Evidence § 38 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited to
this edition without reference to editor].
15. See La. R.S. 15:487 (1981). It should be noted, however, that Federal Rule of
Evidence 607 permits a party to impeach his own witness without this traditional limitation.
16. See State v. Walters, 145 La. 209, 82 So. 197 (1919). See also 3 J. Weinstein
& M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 607 [06], at 607-82 (1982). See also 3A J. Wigmore,
Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1043 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970) (taking the
position that the law should be otherwise, irrespective of the jurisprudence).
17. 437 So. 2d 1124 (La. 1983).
18. See discussion in Pugh & McClelland, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-Evidence, 37 La. L. Rev. 575, 584 (1977), reprinted in
G. Pugh (Supp.), supra note 3, at 178.
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It is not clear from the opinion whether the objection directed the
trial court's and the supreme court's attention to the particular problem
discussed above. In any event, the court found no error in the trial
court's admission of the ostensibly "impeaching" evidence. Since the
opinion does not discuss the above mentioned problem, it is to be hoped
that in the future a witness's testifying that he does not remember a
particular incident will not afford an "impeaching" party the right to
introduce otherwise inadmissible out-of-court statements. Serious con-
frontation problems otherwise may be involved. 9
Impeachment-Hostility
When may one's own witness be declared "hostile" so that he may
be impeached by prior contradictory statements? The matter has given
the courts problems through the years, and two cases decided during
the past term, State v. Laprime20 and State v. West,2' mirror the dif-
ficulties.
In State v. West, a witness called by the prosecution testified,
pursuant to a plea bargain, that the defendant had killed the victim
and that he (the witness) had not participated in the actual killing. After
the prosecution rested, the defense called the same witness and unsuc-
cessfully sought to have the witness declared hostile so that the defense
might ask the witness leading questions and impeach him by prior
contradictory statements to the effect that the witness had previously
stated to several persons that he, rather than the defendant, had killed
the victim. The supreme court upheld the refusal of the trial court to
declare the witness "hostile." The court, relying on prior cases, 22 stated
that the criterion for "hostility" is "a showing that the witness's interest
is on the side of the opposite party to such an extent that he or she
is unlikely to give a true account of the transaction. ' 23 The court also
seemingly approved finding a witness hostile if his answers are evasive
or contradictory.2 4
In State v. Laprime, a burglary case decided the same day as State
v. West, an alleged co-conspirator was called by the prosecution as a
witness. At the witness's guilty-plea proceeding a year prior to defend-
ant's trial, defendant had been implicated as a co-participant in the
burglary. Prior to the Laprime trial the witness had notified the pros-
ecution that he was unwilling to testify. When called by the prosecution,
19. 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 16, 801(d)(l)(A) (071 (1984).
20. 437 So. 2d 1124 (La. 1983).
21. 437 So. 2d 256 (La. 1983).
22. State v. Welch, 368 So. 2d 965 (La. 1979); State v. Willis, 241 La. 796, 131 So.
2d 792 (1961).
23. West, 437 So. 2d at 259.
24. Id. For this proposition the court relied on State v. Edwards, 419 So. 2d 881
(La. 1982), and State v. Bradford, 367 So. 2d 745 (La. 1978).
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the witness maintained that he did not remember the incident. The trial
court, over the defendant's objection, declared the witness hostile and
authorized the prosecution to take steps to impeach him.25 Without
discussing the criterion recognized in State v. West and earlier cases,
the supreme court upheld the witness's being declared hostile.
It seems to these writers that the difficulty experienced by the court
in West and Laprime stems in part from the fact that the Louisiana
statute, instead of requiring both hostility and surprise, speaks of them
in the disjunctive.2 6 If surprise (including affirmative damage) 27 were a
conjunctive, rather than a disjunctive, requirement for impeaching one's
own witness by showing a prior inconsistent statement, then hostility
would not be such a hospitable back door for the admission of evidence
otherwise inadmissible because of the hearsay rule.28
HEARSAY
Res Gestae-The Oft-Criticized Passkey to Admissibility
The "res gestae doctrine" is one of the most criticized in the law
of evidence. 29 It is not inappropriate perhaps to consider the doctrine
as Latin for "let it in." It has been well recognized that it subsumes,
under its general catch-all character, several analytically separate excep-
tions.30 Not surprisingly, it is often used by the courts to admit statements
deemed trustworthy that are not perceived to fit within the demanding
contours of one of the traditionally prescribed hearsay exceptions. One
of the difficulties inherent in this practice is that such usage may
constitute very dangerous precedent for the future. State v. Washington,3'
it is believed, is illustrative.
In Washington, following an armed robbery of a branch bank by
two black men, the robbers were believed to have fled via a railroad
right-of-way behind the bank. About two hours later and five and one-
half miles away, two police officers saw two black men walking along
25. As to whether such an impeachment was proper in light of the fact that the out-
of-court statement did not contradict the testimony of the witness on the merits, see the
discussion supra note 18 and accompanying text.
26. For criticism of the statute see the discussion in Pugh, The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1960-1961 Term-Evidence, 22 La. L. Rev. 397 (1962), reprinted
in G. Pugh, supra note 4, at 135.
27. See authorities cited supra note 16 and accompanying text.
28. Id.
29. Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Matot, 146 F.2d 197, 198 (2d Cir. 1944)
stated that "if it means anything but an unwillingness to think at all, what it covers
cannot be put in less intelligible terms"; see also McCormick on Evidence § 288, at 836;
6 J. Wigmore, supra note 16, § 1767, at 255.
30. See McCormick on Evidence § 288, at 835.
31. 444 So. 2d 320 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 445 So. 2d 450 (1984).
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the railroad right-of-way. After the officers asked the men "if they
knew about the bank robbery," '3 2 one of the latter helpfully "admitted
they had committed the robbery and said he would show them [the
police] where the money was located." 33 Subsequently, the declarant
took the officers to where the pistols and the loot were hidden. The
question presented to the court was whether the statement by the de-
clarant was admissible, over a hearsay objection, against the defendant,
declarant's companion. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled
in the affirmative, holding that the declaration fell within the purview
of Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:447-448 as constituting part of the res
gestae-forming "in conjunction with [the criminal act] one continuous
transaction.34
Because of the silence of the declarant's companion in face of the
accusatory character of the declaration, especially when coupled with
the subsequent discovery of the pistols and the loot, the declaration
certainly seems to have great credibility, even as to the companion.
However, to say that it forms part of the res gestae and is for this
reason admissible, seems to these writers a very dangerous precedent.
To be contrasted with the expansive approach taken by the court
of appeals in Washington is the very narrow ambit given the "res gestae"
articles by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Mitchell." The
"continuous transaction" language of Louisiana Revised Statute 15:448,
it must be conceded, is a very vague, ambiguous test, but it is submitted
that it is both inappropriate and dangerous to give it the expansive
interpretation accorded it by the court of appeals in Washington.
Excited Utterance- Time Element
In State v. Mitchell,3 6 a murder case, the Louisiana Supreme Court
was called upon to decide whether decedent's neighbor could testify that
defendant's brother "came to her residence about ten or fifteen minutes
after the shooting and told her to call the police because 'his sister-in-
law had got shot by his brother. ' '3 7 After analyzing the problem in
terms of res gestae, the court held the testimony inadmissible as coming
too long after the event in question. Because of other circumstances,
however, it found the admission of the testimony non-reversible error.
Courts throughout the country have had great difficulty with the
term "res gestae." 38 Rather than treat the matter under a single evi-
32. Id. at 322.
33. Id.
34. La. R.S. 15:448 (1981).
35. 437 So. 2d 264 (La. 1983), discussed infra text accompanying note 36.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 268.
38. See discussion supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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dentiary rule, the writers feel that it is preferable, as has often been
done in the case law, to divide "res gestae" into its several component
parts and apply separate rules for each of the components. Analyzing
the statement in question as to whether it fits under the excited utterance
exception,39 the writers conclude that it does. In context, the time limit
does not seem overly long. The event was of an extraordinarily exciting
nature. Although not a participant in it, as both the brother-in-law of
the victim of the shooting and brother of the one accused, the declarant
was presumably very moved by the event and there is nothing in the
opinion to suggest that any fabrication was involved.
Much discussion in the books has been devoted to the question of
timeliness. In an oft-cited comment in this Review, then student H.
Alston Johnson, III, describing the case law in Louisiana and other
jurisdictions, stated: "each case must turn on its own facts, and the
circumstances must be such as reasonably to minimize the risk of fab-
rication of details about the event." 4 A similar position was taken by
the Supreme Court Advisory Committee which provided the initial for-
mulation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Addressing the timeliness
question, they quoted, with approval, Professor Slough: "How long can
excitement prevail? Obviously there are no pat answers and the character
of the transaction or event will largely determine the significance of the
time factor." 4'
Applying these concepts, the writers believe that the declaration in
question should have been held to qualify, assuming that declarant's
firsthand knowledge could reasonably have been inferred from the cir-
cumstances 42
Present Sense Impression
Strikingly similar factual circumstances sometimes repeat themselves.
Such are the facts of State v. Doucet43 and those of the famous case
of Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis,44 one of the nation's foundation cases
39. There are a number of Louisiana cases recognizing excited utterance as a separate
exception to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., State v. Krolowitz, 407 So. 2d 1175 (La. 1981);
State v. Brown, 395 So. 2d 1301 (La. 1981); State v. Bean, 337 So. 2d 496 (La. 1976);
State v. Smith, 285 So. 2d 240 (La. 1973). See also Comment, Excited Utterances and
Present Sense Impressions as Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule in Louisiana, 29 La. L.
Rev. 661 (1969), reprinted in G. Pugh, supra note 4, at 494.
40. Comment, Excited Utterances and Present Sense Impressions as Exceptions to
the Hearsay Rule In Louisiana, 29 La. L. Rev. 661, 671 (1969), reprinted in G. Pugh,
supra note 4, at 494, 504.
41. J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice-Rules Pamphlet (pt.2) R. 803[21, at 269
(1984).
42. See Pugh & McClelland, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1976-1977 Term-Evidence, 38 La. L. Rev. 567, 589 (1978).
43. 443 So. 2d 777 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
44. 139 Tex. 1, 161 S.W.2d 474 (1942).
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relative to the admissibility of present sense impressions. As did Houston
Oxygen, Doucet, a negligent homicide case, involved the admissibility
of a statement by the occupant of a car overtaken by a vehicle that
was shortly thereafter involved in an accident. The statement in Doucet
was very similar to that at issue in Houston Oxygen. The witness in
Doucet, over objection, was permitted to testify that a few seconds after
their vehicle was passed by the one driven by the defendant, her husband
stated: "The car was going to have a wreck, run over somebody driving
like that. ' 45 In both cases, the statement was held admissible. Rather
than speak in terms of present sense impression, as did Houston Oxygen,
the Doucet court analyzed the problem in terms of res gestae. Present
sense impression has been recognized by the Louisiana courts46 as a
specific exception to the hearsay rule and it is believed preferable to
analyze the problem as such rather than under the more amorphous
and less precise classification of "res gestae." 47
Former Testimony
One of the requirements generally applicable to the admissibility of
former testimony is that the declarant be "unavailable. ' 48 Is this re-
quirement met if the witness who testified at the prior proceeding is
present at the instant trial but maintains that he or she no longer
remembers the circumstances of the event to which he or she earlier
testified? The problem was presented in State v. Nall.49 In Nail, the
court, following what it found to be a trend throughout the country,
held that a witness's loss of memory may be the basis for finding that
the witness is "unavailable" for this purpose. In affirming the action
of the trial court and admitting the former testimony, the court implied
that the genuineness of the witness's purported loss of memory is a
critical factor in determining admissibility and that such a question
addresses itself to the sound discretion of the trial court. The writers
agree that the question should be one for the trial court, subject to
review by the appellate court. 50 However, the reason given in this case
45. Doucet, 443 So. 2d at 782.
46. State v. Smith, 285 So. 2d 240 (La. 1973), discussed in Pugh & McClelland, The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 La. L.
Rev. 525, 549 (1975), reprinted in G. Pugh (Supp.), supra note 3, at 545.
47. For criticism of res gestae as a satisfactory evidentiary rule, see discussion supra
note 29 and accompanying text.
48. McCormick on Evidence § 255, at 762; Pugh & McClelland, Developments in
the Law, 1979-1980-Evidence, 41 La. L. Rev. 595, 618 (1981); Comment, The Admis-
sibility of Former Testimony in Civil and Criminal Trials, 20 La. L. Rev. 146, 148 (1959),
reprinted in G. Pugh, supra note 4, at 448.
49. 439 So. 2d 420 (La. 1983).
50. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), such questions concerning the admissibility
of evidence are a matter for the court. To the same effect, see State v. Lee, 127 La.
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by the witness for the claimed loss of memory - "that her former
testimony had been based on a statement made to police while she was
under the influence of tranquilizers and for that reason she could not
remember what she had said at the first trial"', - seems to these writers
very unpersuasive, for it does not seem to explain why she "remembered"
at the first trial but not at the second.
Admissions-Silence After Arrest
Even prior to Miranda v. Arizona 2 and Doyle v. Ohio," the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court took the position that silence of an individual
under arrest is generally inadmissible.14 This position was reiterated in
the recent case of State v. Bell," but the court found an exception to
be applicable. Bell was accused of forging his grandmother's name to
three checks made out in his favor. The defense counsel's opening
statement disclosed his client's defense-that the grandmother had au-
thorized the defendant's action and that the defendant would take the
stand to so testify; that defense counsel could not say why defendant
was being prosecuted; that "people make mistakes. They don't investigate
thoroughly. Possibly that's the situation here." '5 6 This imputation of a
possible failure to investigate adequately, reasoned the court, lowered
the protective bar that otherwise would have been available to the
defendant, permitting the prosecution to show that after the defendant
had been arrested and taken to the sheriff's office, he had refused to
make a statement or tell of his involvement in the case. By thus casting
an aspersion upon the adequacy of the investigation in the case, de-
fendant was held to have opened the door to otherwise inadmissible
testimony. In light of this case, defense counsel must be very careful
in making arguments or presenting testimony which may be deemed to
have "opened the door" (or should we say, Pandora's box?) to this
type of testimony.
1077, 54 So. 356 (1911).
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3), in defining "unavailability," states that "'unavailability
as a witness' includes situations in which the declarant ... (3) testifies to a lack of memory
of the subject matter of his statement." The House Judicial Committee made clear, however,
that "the Committee intends no change in existing federal law under which the court may
choose to disbelieve the declarant's testimony as to his lack of memory." Fed. R. Evid.
804(a)(3) (report of House Judicial Committee).
51. Nail, 439 So. 2d at 423.
52. 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966).
53. 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240 (1976).
54. See State v. Hayden, 243 La. 793, 147 So. 2d 392 (1962), discussed in Note,
Evidence-Admissibility of Silence After Arrest as Implied Admission, 24 La. L. Rev.
115 (1963), reprinted in G. Pugh, supra note 4, at 323.
55. 446 So.2d 1191 (La. 1984).
56. Id. at 1194.
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Statements by Co-conspirators
The rule authorizing the admission, under certain circumstances,
over a hearsay objection, of co-conspirators' declarations finds its origins
in the rule authorizing the admissibility of a party's admissions.5 7 The
theory was that under the circumstances specified in the co-conspirator
rule, the co-conspirator is deemed to have been authorized by the de-
fendant to make the statement in question. Just as a person is deemed
responsible for the actions of his co-conspirator, so also, went the theory,
he must answer for statements made by the co-conspirator during the
conspiracy and in furtherance thereof.
The co-conspirator rule has been the subject of strong criticism.5 8
State v. Johnson59 seems to these writers a good example of an inap-
propriate use of the co-conspirator finesse of the hearsay rule. Defendant
Johnson was convicted of an utterly heinous offense-the murder of
his mother via the act of a hireling co-conspirator. Finding that there
had been prima facie evidence of a conspiracy (aliunde the statement
of the alleged co-conspirator), the supreme court held admissible a
statement by a witness that the co-conspirator had stated to him that
the defendant had told the co-conspirator that he would pay him $2,000
to kill the victim and another, and that he (the co-conspirator) wished
to borrow the witness's sportcoat in order to wear it at the race track
Where the defendant would point out the victims-to-be. The admissibility
of that part of the witness's testimony relative to what the witness said
the co-conspirator said the defendant said seems to these writers an
over-extension of the co-conspirator rule.60 This seems particularly true
when it is remembered that Louisiana has adopted a "prima facie"
evidence requirement, 61 rather than insisting that the judge himself rule
upon the existence of the conspiracy as a prerequisite to admitting the
alleged co-conspirator's statement. 62
57. See McCormick on Evidence § 267, at 792.
58. See 4 J. Wigmore, supra note 16, §§ 1079, 1080, 1080(a), at 180-201. See also
Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal
Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1378 (1972); Morgan, The Rationale
of Vicarious Admissions, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 461 (1929); Comment, The Co-Conspirator
Exception to the Hearsay Rule: The Limits of Its Logic, 37 La. L. Rev. 1101 (1977).
59. 438 So. 2d 1091 (La. 1983).
60. For an interesting recent case involving an analogous situation, see State v. Farber,
56 Or. App. 351, 642 P.2d 668 (1982) (en banc), rev'd on reconsideration, 59 Or. App.
725, 652 P.2d 372 (1982) (en banc), aff'd, 295 Or. 199, 666 P.2d 821 (1983) (en banc),
where after extensive consideration and reconsideration by the Oregon Court of Appeal,
the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of an alleged co-conspirator's statement,
in light of what were found to be particular guarantees of trustworthiness.
61. La. R.S. 15:455 (1981).
62. See in this connection United States v. James, 576 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1978),
aff'd on reconsideration, 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
917 (1979).
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Although it is reasonable perhaps to make one responsible for what
his confederate did and said in furtherance of their common objective,
it seems to stretch unduly the concept to make one responsible for what
the confederate said the defendant said as to the origins of their nefarious
association. It must be remembered that the genesis of the co-conspirator
rule lies not in any notion that the circumstance of conspiracy engenders
trustworthiness, but rather in the principle underlying the admissibility
of admissions-that one should be held responsible for what he or his
agent has said, i.e., forced to respond or suffer the consequences. The
critical and troublesome question in the Johnson case is whether Johnson
in fact had made the statement attributed to him by the person who
actually did the killing. Testimony that an alleged co-conspirator had
said that the defendant had hired him to do a killing is not particularly
persuasive that the defendant in fact hired him.
The problem is analogous to a double hearsay question. It is not
the usual double hearsay question, however, for the co-conspirator rule
is not based upon notions of trustworthiness. 63 Since the admissibility
of the co-conspirator's statement is not based upon trustworthiness,6
there is an inherent difficulty in relying upon the co-conspirator "ex-
ception" to provide the needed evidence that the defendant in fact made
the statement attributed to him by the out-of-court, unsworn, un-cross-
examined statement of the co-conspirator.
If the co-conspirator had been on the stand, then of course he could
have testified, over a hearsay objection, that the defendant had hired
him to do the dastardly deed, for the defendant's out-of-court statement
would then have been directly admissible as an admission. The alleged
co-conspirator would have been on the stand, under oath, and subject
to cross-examination-not so in the instant case. The co-conspirator may
well have had reasons of his own for implicating the defendant quite
apart from trustworthiness-reasons that the defendant was utterly un-
able to develop by cross-examination.
CONFESSIONS-THE FREE AND VOLUNTARY REQUIREMENT
The free and voluntary test has long been required in Louisiana for
the admissibility of confessions. Years before Miranda v. Arizona65 and
earlier federal constitutional impositions, 66 Louisiana adopted a strongly
63. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the rule relative to double hearsay, rule
805, would technically be inapplicable because the provision relative to the admissibility
of co-conspirators' statements is not a hearsay exception.
64. See McCormick on Evidence § 262, at 775; Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E); see also
advisory committee note to subdivision (d)(2) of Federal Rule 801 which states that "[n]o
guarantee of trustworthiness is required.
65. 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
66. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 81 S. Ct. 735 (1961); Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S. 278, 56 S. Ct. 461 (1936).
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worded free and voluntary requirement. 67
State v. Wilms"s presents what is for these writers an inappropriate
application of traditional rules in this area. Shortly after defendant and
his companion were arrested for armed robbery, defendant's wife and
another woman in a van parked nearby were also arrested. Defendant's
wife was two and one-half months pregnant. According to uncontradicted
testimony, "a police officer hit [the wife] in the stomach and kicked
her as she was climbing into the police van," 69 apparently in the presence
of the defendant. Further, according to the defendant, the police "tossed
[his wife] around 'like a rag doll"' 70 After the arrestees were given a
statement of their legal rights, another officer was placed in charge of
interrogation. Although advised that the wife was pregnant, had been
struck in the stomach by a police officer, was bleeding and needed
medical attention, the officer, instead of securing medical attention for
the woman, continued to investigate the case and secured a confession
from defendant and a statement from his wife. It was not until the
next morning, more than eight hours after the original incident, that
defendant's wife received medical attention. Eight days later, the wife
miscarried.
Upholding the action of the trial court in admitting the confession,
the majority concluded that the trial court could properly have found
that traditional free and voluntary requirements were met. Justice Lem-
mon, in a very persuasive dissenting opinion concurred in by Justice
Dennis, argued that a "common sense" approach should be taken and
that the confession should be deemed inadmissible.
The writers agree with the dissenting justices. In light of the un-
contradicted testimony as to the initial violent handling of defendant's
67. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 451 (1928); State v. Nelson, 3 La. Ann. 497 (1848);
State v. Havelin, 6 La. Ann. 167 (1851). Interestingly, in 1804 the first session of the
Legislative Council of the Territory of Orleans provided:
[N]o person accused of any crime shall be forced to answer any interrogatories
whatever, touching on the offence of which he shall be accused; but every
justice of the peace, commandant, or other judicial officer, before whom any
person, charged with the commission of any crime, may be brought for ex-
amination previous to commitment, shall take the voluntary declarations of such
person so accused, and the answers, which, without menance or promise, he
shall freely make to the questions which such officers shall propose, and reduce
the same to writing, and cause the same to be subscribed by the declarant in
his presence, and shall certify the same under the hand of him, the said justice,
commandant or the judicial officer, as aforesaid; which declaration, so signed
and certified, shall be evidence both to the grand and petit jury, on a presentment
or indictment, and trial for such offence.
Acts Passed at the First Session of the Legislative Council of the Territory of Orleans,
chap. VII, § 1 (1805).
68. 449 So. 2d 442 (La. 1984).
69. Id. at 443.
70. Id.
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wife by the arresting officers, the fact that the wife's condition was
brought to the attention of the investigating officer before defendant's
confession was obtained, and that medical attention was not afforded
the wife until eight hours after she was struck by the police, the reasons
underlying the free and voluntary requirement would seem to demand
that an extraordinarily heavy burden be placed upon the prosecution to
show that any confession taken under the circumstances be "free and
voluntary." Such a showing, it is believed, was not made. One may
anticipate that the case will find its way to the federal courts.
HARMLESS ERROR
The Louisiana Supreme Court decision in State v. Banks71 is a very
important pronouncement concerning "harmless" error. In the 1974 case
of State v. Michelli,72 the supreme court had made a strong statement
as to the inappropriateness of regarding certain errors as "harmless."
In Michelli, Chief Justice (then Justice) Dixon, speaking for the majority
of the court, stated '[harmless error' is a doctrine which permits an
appellate court to affirm a conviction in spite of error appearing in the
record. It has been called a 'cop-out' for appellate judges - an ab-
dication of the judicial function in criminal appeals. ' 73 In 1980, in State
v. Gibson, 74 the court again displayed a stern attitude towards error.
Despite these strong pronouncements, Louisiana courts have at times
reflected what the writers regard as too indulgent an attitude towards
error committed in the trial court." In State v. Banks,16 the Louisiana
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, after reviewing State v. Gibson, stated:
Since Gibson, however, several decisions have recognized a
second device for weighing the effect of erroneously admitted
evidence.
Those cases hold that where erroneously admitted evidence is
merely "cumulative" with that which was properly admitted at
trial, a reviewing court will be warranted in finding the tainted
evidence harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 77
Reversing the court of appeal decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court
71. 439 So. 2d 407 (La. 1983), rev'g 428 So. 2d 544 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
72. 301 So. 2d 577 (La. 1974).
73. Id. at 579.
74. 391 So. 2d 421 (La. 1980).
75. See Pugh & McClelland, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983-Evidence, 44 La.
L. Rev. 335, 353 (1983); Pugh & McClelland, Developments in the Law, 1979-1980-
Evidence, 41 La. L. Rev. 595, 622 (1981).
76. 428 So. 2d 544 (La. App. 4th Cir.), rev'd, 439 So. 2d 407 (La. 1983), discussed
in Pugh & McClelland, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983-Evidence, 44 La. L. Rev.
335, 353 (1983).
77. Banks, 428 So. 2d at 546.
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manifested a lack of enthusiasm for a "cumulative" evidence test, and
distinguished and seemingly limited the post-Gibson cases, relied upon
by the court of appeal. Further, it infused new life and vigor into
Gibson. Significantly, in addition to finding the "cumulative" evidence
exception "improperly applied in this case," the court characterized the
cumulative exception as "tenuous." Concluding a strongly worded opin-
ion, Chief Justice Dixon, speaking for five members of the court, stated:
"It cannot be said, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the improperly
admitted hearsay, which violated R.S. 15:434, United States Constitution,
Amendment 6 and Louisiana Constitution, Article I, §16, did not con-
tribute to the verdict." ' 78
78. Banks, 439 So. 2d at 410.
